Disregard for historical context of facts may lead to serious mistakes. Legal analysts and, above all, policy makers should be aware of fh«t The policy of non-recognition of the changed reality in Central and Eastern Europe has been influenced by that oversight Moreover, insensitivity to the contextual dimension often led to incorrect assessment of actual facts, and to unsuccessful policy efforts -particularly in the case of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.
The article by Roland Rich is remarkably accurate in its presentation of complex facts and in their historical context The war characterizing the dissolution of Yugoslavia started with the armed attack of the Yugoslav army against Slovenia on 27 June 1991. The apparent failure of the attack was followed by the Brioni Declaration of 7 July, and the Federal Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia decided, with the obvious agreement of the Yugoslav army, to withdraw the army from Slovenia. That retreat began in the middle of July 1991 and was completed by 25 October 1991.
The defeat of the Yugoslav army in Slovenia marked the beginning of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The war in Croatia which started in the second half of July 1991 (prior to that there were only armed incidents in Croatia, mostly resulting from Serb guerilla attacks on Croat police forces) made the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia irreversible. Yugoslavia was vitally depending on the coexistence of Serbs and Croats.
2 The large armed conflict among them in the Summer of 1991 spawned two crucial consequences: it rendered the continuation of a common Serbo-Croat state of Yugoslavia impossible and made, all other nations of ex-Yugoslavia, and particularly the Bosnian Muslims, the victims.
These facts would have been easily grasped by policy-makers in the Summer of 1991 had they appropriately understood their historical context The ability to realistically face the situation and draw concrete conclusions, including those necessary for the timely recognition of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, was lacking. Instead, the European community -until the end of September 1991 the only major international power involved in the Balkan embroilment -relied heavily on the idea of keeping the defunct Yugoslavia as a single state. Slovenia and Croatia remained unrecognized and the Belgrade government continued to be considered as holding an illusionary authority over the whole territory of the former Yugoslavia. The conference on Yugoslavia (originally defined as 'Peace Conference') was convened without a clear understanding of its purpose -to many it seemed an instrument for the rcconstitution of Yugoslavia and it relied on the illusion that a package solution was possible.
The policies on Yugoslavia were formulated in the Summer of 1991 under the threat of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is understandable (and very accurately described in the paper by Roland Rich) that the main Western states adopted an extremely cautious approach to the situation arising from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, given that it was one of the two superpowers. Therefore, it is natural that they did not wish to create any precedent in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The paradoxical aspect of this approach was that this type of caution was unnecessary, as the successor states of die former Soviet Union showed a remarkable level of political wisdom and common sense -and resolved most of die outstanding questions in 1991 by agreement 3 Although that approach was, perhaps, influenced by the example of Yugoslavia (in particular by the ugly aspects thereof which probably had a deterrent effect), there is no reason to believe that the smooth transition from Soviet Empire into the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991 was in any significant way influenced by the approach taken by the Western states.
In short, die policy pursued by the Western states with respect to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union did not contribute to solving any of the historical problems in mat part of the world. The process of change took its own course and die attempts to reverse or stop it were unsuccessful. The policy makers failed in many questions posed in the process, including those concerning the recognition of new states. For example, the EC Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in die Soviet Union of 16 December 1991 contained a series of legal requirements including the declaration by the new states aspiring for recognition that they accept various international legal obligations. On die other hand, the guidelines, and the pertinent practice of Western states disregarded one of die classical criteria for recognition namely die criterion of effectiveness of the governments of the states which were aspiring for recognition.
Roland Rich accurately describes the inconsistencies characterizing die process of recognition. Although die EC and USA, togedrcr with other Western states reiterated, in various ways, their reliance on traditional international legal criteria for recognition, their policy of non-recognition of various states was far from being consistent application of legal criteria. Thus Slovenia which has fulfilled all traditional criteria represents probably the most important manifestation of that process. In that declaration all successor states of the fonner Soviet Union agreed that the USSR ceased to exist.
since July 1991 remained unrecognized by the EC until mid January 1992, and by the USA until April 1992. Macedonia which also fulfilled these criteria, at least since the end of 1991, has remained unrecognized for a much longer period due to a dispute over its name; a dispute which carries a great deal of irrationality in conformity with the history of the Balkans.
On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina -which was unable to fulfil the criterion of effectiveness -became recognized in April 1992 and was admitted to the UN on 22 May 1992. However, it would be wrong to conclude that recognition and admission of that state to the UN was necessarily a political mistake. The recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not only fair and just but also -paradoxically, in accordance with state practice. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina it should have been clear that the emerging state would need more than formal recognition, admission to the UN and establishment of diplomatic relations. The Conference on Yugoslavia could have been -but was not -used for the purpose of creating appropriate guarantees for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This omission was probably due to (a) divergent opinions among the major powers regarding the approach to the Yugoslav crisis in general and (b) the lack of readiness to act by force, if necessary, to protect the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus to give credibility to the international support for Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence.
It is important to note that jurists did not make the mistakes which characterized most of the political dealings with the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia (the 'Badinter Arbitration Commission') rightly concluded in its Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991 that Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, given the fact that its federal organs had lost both representativity and effectiveness. 4 
DamloTflrk
The opinions of the Arbitration Commission were not legally binding and also did not deal with all implications of the situation of the dissolution of a state and emergence of successor states. The fact that the Arbitration Commission's opinion on recognition of Macedonia was not heeded by political fora of the EC, and that no serious action was taken to demonstrate that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was a new state, illustrated the difficulties involved in the political implementation of a legal opinion. Moreover, the fact that the Arbitration Commission was not invited to propose measures necessary to uphold independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a state with obvious shortcomings in the effectiveness of its government, is an illustration of the incomprehensiveness of the political approach which was taken. It might be argued that the Arbitration Commission should have proposed such measures independently even though this was not specifically requested. However, it remains doubtful whether such an activist approach would be wise in a situation characterized by the overwhelming prevalence of political considerations over application of legal criteria.
In short, the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia were legally consistent and correct, notwithstanding their inconsistent implementation and the silence of the Commission with regard to some questions which were of obvious relevance. The latter shortcoming was caused by political barriers and was not consequent from a decision of the Arbitration Commission itself.
On the other hand there are some questions which have not received a complete legal opinion and which were relevant to both the Yugoslav and Soviet cases of dissolution of states as discussed in Roland Rich's paper. The most important among them is the twin question of the territorial integrity of successor states and the protection of minorities on their respective territories.
The Arbitration Commission and the Conference on Yugoslavia have relied on the principle of uti possidetis with respect to the frontiers among the former republics. This was the first time that that principle was directly applied in Europe. The Arbitration Commission referred in its Opinion No. 3 to the 1986 International Court of Justice judgment in the dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali 7 to argue in favour of general applicability of the uti possidetis doctrine. 8 The EC and the international community have, in fact, relied on the same principle with respect to the successors of the former Soviet Union.
Roland Rich rightly highlights the difficulties involved in the realization of that approach, particularly in situations involving large minorities which are in some cases regional majorities. He concluded that it would be difficult to limit the application of that principle to a single geographic area (Europe) or to a type of nation with a particular method of internal organization (federalism). While this is generally correct it must also be recognized that both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were federations in which federal organization relied heavily on the ethnic component Moreover, the federal units -the Republics -were constitutionally defined as 'states' with both defined borders and a considerable amount of constitutional power, which included authority in the field of international relations. 9 These were not purely formal features but also had considerable political importance, both in terms of the duration of those two federations and in the process of their dissolution. Therefore die dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia cannot be seen as a real precedent for the situations that might arise in states with different types of history and another type of political organization.
The question of die protection of minorities and, where possible and necessary, the adjustment of frontiers, remains open. All political fora, including the EC, CSCE and. the UN, along with the Arbitration Commission agreed to the principle that peaceful change of frontiers, based on die agreement of states concerned, was permissible. It seems that such a possibility would be more likely to be realized if die pertinent international organization provided an appropriate institutional framework to facilitate die process of agreement Moreover, it also seems that international institutional support would be necessary to encourage and supervise die evolution of appropriate minority protection regimes. Such institutional arrangements, some of which have already been conceived within die framework of die CSCE would represent a contemporary realization of the concept of peaceful change -a well known notion in international law, and one that may facilitate future political change and rhinimi7f. its impact on die international community. Journal, whereby the Government undertook to abide by the international agreements cited in the Guidelines; 6. Answers, dated 8 January 1992, to the Commission's request for additional information on 3 January. The Commission also had before ittwo letters, dated 22 December 1991 and9 January 1992, from the President of the 'Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina', copies of which were sent to the Chairman of the Commission on the same dates.
Having regard to the information before it, and having heard the Rapporteur, the Arbitration Commission delivers die following opinion:
1. By an instrument adopted separately by the Presidency and the Government of BosniaHerzegovina on 20 December 1991 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic on 23 December these authorities accepted all the commitments indicated in the Declaration and the Guidelines of 16 December 1991.
In that instrument the authorities in question emphasized that Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted the draft Convention produced by the Hague Conference on 4 November 1991, notably the provisions in Phqpfw II on human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups.
By a Decision of 8 January 1992 the Government of the SRBH accepted and undertook to apply the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and all other international instruments guaranteeing human rights and freedoms and to abide by the commitments previously entered into by the SFRY concerning disarmament and arms control.
The current Constitution of the SRBH guarantees equal rights for 'the nations of BosniaHerzegovina -Muslims, Serbs and Croats -and the members of the other nations and ethnic groups living on its territory'.
The current Constitution of the SRBH guarantees respect for human rights, and the authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina have sent the Commission a list of the laws in force giving effect to those principles; they also gave the Commission assurances that the new Constitution now being framed would provide full guarantees for individual human rights and freedoms.
The authorities gave the Commission an assurance that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had no territorial claims on neighbouring countries and was willing to guarantee their territorial integrity.
They These provisions are to be given effect by statute. In schools where instruction is to be given in die language of one of die other nationalities, die Macedonian language must also be taught. (e) In this connection Article 45 is important since it provides that any citizen may set up a private school at any educational level except primary. Article 19(4) provides tiiat religious communities are also entitled to establish schools. In both these cases, however, die precise extent of die rights in question has still to be determined by legislation. (f) In die matter of language and script. Article 7(2) provides that in communities where the majority of die inhabitants belong to another nationality, the language and script of that odier nationality must be used for official purposes, alongside die Macedonian language and me Cyrillic alphabet Article 7(3) makes me same pro vision for communities where a substantial number of inhabitants belong to a given nationality. In both these cases, however, the rights in question have still to be determined in precise terms by legislation, (g) Article 9(1) of the Constitution prohibits any discrimination on grounds of race, colour, national or social origin, or political or religious convictions. (d) As regards accepting all relevant commitments concerning disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation and regional security and stability, the Republic of Slovenia underlines the fact that its desire to gain independence and sovereignty peaceably is expressed in the Declaration of Independence; and that since the Federal Army began to withdraw on 25 October Slovenia's armaments have been reduced to the minimum needed to defend its territory. Both in its application for recognition and in answer to the Commission's questionnaire, the Republic of Slovenia accepts that it is a successor state in respect of international treaties to which Yugoslavia is party, including the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; once rfC"gr""H, the Republic also intends to bring forward proposals on regional security and stability. (e) As regards the settlement by agreement ofissues relating to state succession and regional disputes (including recourse to arbitration), the Republic of Slovenia accepts this condition both in its application for recognition and in its answers to the Commission's questionnaire; it also points out that this has been its position since the Conference began; lastly, it accepts the principle of going to arbitration where the parties are agreed, and accepts that the arbitral award is binding. The Arbitration Commission considers that it falls to it to ascertain its competence independent of any dispute on this point It therefore serves no purpose to give a verdict on the admissibility of preliminary objections raised in the case.
On f>
1. The question whether the Commission is the judge of its own competence is of a prior nature and must be examined first Only if the Arbitration Commission reaches a conclusion in the affirmati ve will it fall to it to gi ve a verdict on its competence in the case at hand. For the purposes of this examination, it is necessary to look into the legal nature of the Commission.
2. The Commission was established not by the Brioni agreement of 7 July 1991 but by the joint statement on Yugoslavia adopted at an extraordinary meeting of ministers in the context of European political cooperation on 27 August 1991, for the purpose of establishing an 'arbitration procedure', which was not defined but was to lead to 'decisions'. These arrangements were accepted by the six Yugoslav Republics at the opening of the Conference for Peace on 7 September 1991. Although the arrangements were summary, it is clear from the terminology used and even the composition of the Commission that the intention was to create a body capable of resolving on the basis of law the differences which were to be submitted to it by the parties, which precisely constitutes the definition of arbitration (see ICJ, Judgment of 12 November 1991, Arbitral award of 31 July 1989,1991 reports, p. 70).
3. As the International Court of Justice pointed out, 'since the Alabama case, it has been generally recognized that, following the earlier precedents, and in the absence of any agreements 2 Unofficial translation.
to the contrary, the international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction (...) This principle, which is accepted by general international law in the matter of arbitration, assumes particular force when the international tribunal is no longer an arbitral tribunal constituted by virtue of a special agreement between the parties for the purpose of adjudicating on a particular dispute, but is an instrument which has been pre-established by an international instrument defining its jurisdiction and regulating its operation'. (Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection), 1953 reports, p. 119). It therefore falls to the Commission to pronounce upon its competence. 4. This being contested across the board, the Commission considers that it falls to it to give judgment in a single decision on these objections before camming, if necessary, each of the questions which have been submitted to it 5. The Commission finds that the initial rules governing its functioning were supplemented and clarified by certain texts following its creation and by the practice followed by the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia and by the responsible authorities in the various Yugoslav Republics.
So, for example, in a new joint statement dated 3 September 1991, the Community and its Member States decided that 'In the framework of the Conference, the Chairman will transmit to th* Ai+rifTiirinnPjimmiiL'rinnttvingM^iiaihmirtrHfrii Hil»i|iflfjp« flpd^h^r^iltflnfthf.PnrmTtinginn'g deliberations will be put back to the Conference through the Chairman. The rules of procedure for the arbitration will be established by the Arbitrators, after taking into account existing organizations in the field.' The six Republics also accepted these arrangements.
6. In November 1991, the Republic of Serbia took the initiative of submitting three questions to the Commission, of which two were transmitted by the Chairman of the Conference, who also asked a third questions of his own. All the Republics took part in this procedure and none made the least mention of any incompetence on the Commission's part, demonstrating an identical interpretation of its mandate, and thereby recognizing its competence in consultative issues as welL 7. The Arbitration Commission also notes that it was established in the framework of the Conference for Peace as a body of this Conference. Replying to the questions put by the Chairman of the Conference constitutes Commission participation in the work of the Conference, of which it is a body, and it would require conclusive reasons to bring it to refuse such a request
In the present case, the Commission sees no reason to refuse to perform its functions. 8. The Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia has a mission 'to re-establish peace for all in Yugoslavia and to achieve lasting solutions which respect all legitimate concerns and legitimate aspirations'. (Joint statement of 7 September 1991 at the opening ceremony of the Conference).
Consequently, in attempting to enlighten the Conference on the legal aspects of problems which it encounters in carrying out this mission, the Arbitration Commission remains fully within the role entrusted to it by the European Community and its Member States on the one hand and the six Republics on the other.
9. The legal nature of the questions put, far from constituting an obstacle to the Arbitration Commission's exercising its competence, is, on the contrary, a justification: as the arbitral body of the Conference, the Commission can give a judgment only in law, in the absence of any express authorization to the contrary from the parties, it being specified that in this case it is called upon to express opinions on the legal rules applying.
10. In consequence, the Arbitration Commission has decided: -that it falls to it to give a judgment on its competence when it is so seized; -that in this case, given the nature of me functions which have been given to it, it is competent to reply in the form of In an interlocutory decision today, the Commission found that this matter was within its competence.
1. In its Opinion No. 1 of 29 November, the Arbitration Commission found that -a state's existence or non-existence had to be established on the basis of universally acknowledged principles of international law concerning the constituent elements of a state; -the SFRY was at that time still a legal international entity but the desire for independence had been expressed through referendums in the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, and through a resolution on sovereignty in Bosnia-Herzegovina; -the composition and functioning of essential bodies of the Federation no longer satisfied the intrinsic requirements of a federal state regarding participation and representativeness; -recourse to force in different parts of the Federation had demonstrated the Federation's impotence; -the SFRY was in the process of dissolution but it was nevertheless up to the Republics which so wished to continue, if appropriate, a new association with democratic institutions of their choice; -the existence or disappearance of a state is, in any case, a matter of fact 2. The dissolution of a state means that it no longer has legal personality, something which has major repercussions in international law. It therefore calls for the greatest caution.
The Commission finds that the existence of a federal state, which is made up of a number of separate entities, is seriously compromised when a majority of these entities, embracing a greater part of the territory and population, constitute themselves as sovereign states with the result that federal authority may no longer be effectively exercised.
By the same token, while recognition of a state by other states has only declarative value, such recognition, along with membership of international organizations, bears witness to these states' conviction that the political entity so recognized is a reality and confers on it certain rights and obligations nivf^T international law. The chief concern is that the solution adopted should lead to an equitable outcome, with the states concerned agreeing procedures subject to compliance with the imperatives of general international law and, more particularly, the fundamental rights of the individual and of peoples and minorities.
3. In the declaration on former Yugoslavia adopted in Lisbon on 27 June 1992, the European Council stated that: 
